In a recent memorandum opinion, Magistrate Judge Sherry R. Fallon denied defendant’s motion to transfer venue to the Northern District of California and denied plaintiff’s motion to strike portions of the declaration of William Pringle, who defendant employs as a compliance associate. Agincourt Gaming, LLC v. Zynga, Inc., C.A. No. 11-720-RGA-SRF (D. Del. Jun. 18, 2013) (publicly-available redacted version issued Jun. 27, 2013 (D.I. 62)). Considering defendant’s motion to transfer, Judge Fallon found plaintiff’s forum preference weighed against transfer, “although not as strongly as it would if [plaintiff] had its principal place of business in Delaware.” Id. at 4. On the other hand, Judge Fallon found that defendant’s forum preference, and “to a lesser extent,” the location of books and records, and “practical considerations” favored transfer. See id. As Judge Fallon explained, defendant’s forum preference had a “legitimate basis,” as it maintains its principal place of business in the Northern District of California where “most of its employees are located.” Id. Further, Judge Fallon found that the location of the books and records weighed slightly in favor of transfer because while defendant did not deny “that it [would] produce all relevant records electronically,” plaintiff did “not dispute that most of the relevant documents are located in the Northern District of California.” Id. at 6. Moreover, with respect to practical considerations that could make the trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive, Judge Fallon noted that “[plaintiff] does not deny the fact that it will be more expensive and less convenient for [defendant] to litigate in Delaware, and does not contend that it would be substantially more convenient and less expensive for [plaintiff] to litigate in Delaware.” Id. at 7. Finding that the other public and private interest factors did “not add much weight to the balancing and are neutral,” Judge Fallon denied defendant’s motion to transfer. Id. at 4, 8.
With respect to the motion to strike, plaintiff first argued that the court should strike Paragraph 7 of William Pringle’s declaration because “he did not select the five employees slated to testify at trial based on his personal knowledge.” Id. Denying plaintiff’s motion, Judge Fallon explained that “[n]othing in the record suggests that Pringle did not have personal knowledge of the responsibilities of the five listed witnesses, their knowledge of the accused products, whether they would testify at trial, and whether they lived in the San Francisco Bay area.” Id. at 9. Further, as Judge Fallon noted, defendant offered “additional evidence” of which employees would testify and their locations in the form of Pringle’s 30(b)(6) deposition. Id. Second, Judge Fallon denied plaintiff’s motion to strike Paragraph 13, in which Pringle stated that he “’ha[s] been informed’ of matters relating to the content of possible trial testimony.” Id. Plaintiff argued this statement constituted inadmissible hearsay, but Judge Fallon found that Paragraph 13 was merely “intended to show that the previously identified . . . employees” of defendant are capable of testifying with respect to relevant topics. Id. Third, plaintiff moved to strike Paragraph 15 of Pringle’s declaration on the grounds that “Pringle lacked knowledge on which to base his assessment at his deposition regarding how burdensome and expensive it would be to litigate in Delaware.” Id. at 10. Denying plaintiff’s motion, Judge Fallon found that Pringle had “personal knowledge, based on the number of games at issue in the suit, that the production of documents could be substantial and costly.” Id.
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